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Abstract
Political science traditionally has either ignored biology in favor of purely envi-
ronmental explanations for political phenomena or merely ruminated about the 
likely role of biology, leaving data-based research on biopolitics in dangerously 
short supply. Currently, attention to the apparent genetic basis for political and 
social orientations holds the greatest promise of advancing empirical biopolitics. 
Thus, in this essay, we orient behavior genetics research in the larger framework 
of biology and politics, confront its normative implications, describe the tech-
niques involved, assess the strengths and weaknesses of commonly employed 
data and procedures, and describe the next steps in this research stream. Because 
these next steps involve molecular genetic work, we provide some background 
genetic information, but we mainly urge political scientists to join interdisciplin-
ary teams so that nature and nurture can both be employed in ongoing efforts to 
understand the sources of mass-scale human politics.
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Introduction
Original empirical research connecting 
biology to politics is disappointingly rare 
in political science. We begin this review by 
discussing work being done in cognate dis-
ciplines and by addressing the normative 
reservations some political scientists seem 
to harbor concerning biologically informed 
research. We then provide extensive de-
scription of a technique—the classic twin 
design—that has been employed by politi-
cal scientists of late and that is equipped to 
serve as an entry point for biology into the 
research repertoire of political science, just 
as it has in other disciplines. But the twin 
design has limitations; therefore, later in the 
essay, we describe molecular genetic work 
that can be done in cooperation with genet-
icists to identify the precise genes and bio-
logical systems relevant to politics. We pay 
particular attention to the application of 
these techniques to the study of political at-
titudes, but we conclude with a discussion 
of the way in which the incorporation of bi-
ology can enhance research in virtually ev-
ery subfield of political science.
 
Political Science, Psychology, Economics, 
and Behavior Genetics
A biological approach to political science 
is hardly new. In fact, biopolitics stretches 
back nearly as far as behavioral politics; 
both approaches found their first enthusias-
tic practitioners in the behavioral revolution 
of the 1960s. Some might even argue that 
the pedigree of biopolitics is longer than 
that of behavioralism, going back to Aris-
totle’s notable claim that “man is by nature 
a political animal.” What is striking is that 
behavioralism in political science is inex-
tricably bound up with empirical research, 
whereas biopolitics has remained largely 
theoretical, descriptive, and speculative 
(see, e.g., the notable work of Ira Carmen, 
Bryan Jones, Roger Masters, Steven Peter-
son, Albert Somit, Joseph Tannenhaus, John 
Wahlke, and James Q. Wilson). That must 
change if political scientists are to play any 
role in the rapidly emerging synthesis of bi-
ology and the social sciences.
In terms of biological mechanism, empir-
ical research on the biology of social behav-
ior can be roughly divided into work that is 
focused on the brain (and associated neu-
rotransmitters) and work that is focused 
on genes. Among the social sciences, psy-
chology is notable for having developed ro-
bust research agendas in both physiological 
realms. Cognitive psychology is the most 
visible example of a focus on brain physiol-
ogy, and the extensive research on the heri-
tability of social traits typically is associated 
with the behavior genetics research of psy-
chologists such as Thomas Bouchard and 
David Lykken. Economics has recently de-
veloped a widely publicized research focus 
on the brain, evidenced by the formation of 
a Society for Neuroeconomics and an asso-
ciated well-attended annual meeting for the 
presentation of neurocognitive economic re-
search (for informative examples, see recent 
work by Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Read 
Montague, Tania Singer, and Paul Zak). To 
date, however, very little research in eco-
nomics has focused on genetics. In polit-
ical science there has been very little of ei-
ther kind of work, despite the longstanding 
presence of a biopolitics subgroup within 
the discipline.
The scarcity of empirical work in bio-
politics may result from the fact that bio-
politics has to a substantial degree fol-
lowed the lead of evolutionary psychology 
in focusing on the role of human genetics 
and brain physiology in establishing broad 
human behavioral universals, such as hi-
erarchy, war, leadership behavior, and 
sexual politics. The problem for empiri-
cal work that focuses on human univer-
sals is that these universals, by definition, 
leave insufficient variation in central de-
pendent variables. The need for variation 
is not unique to empirical biopolitics, and 
the frustrations of relying primarily on sto-
chastic variation for the study of humans 
are familiar to all behavioral political sci-
entists. One exception exploited by psy-
Gene: a sequence of 
DNA base pairs that 
constitutes the basic 
unit of inheritance
Neurotransmitters: 
complex proteins that 
are part of the ner-
vous system and affect 
behavior
Heritability: the pro-
portion of phenotypic 
variance among individ-
uals attributable to ge-
netic differences in that 
population
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chologists in studying human universals 
is the existence of cognitive and behavioral 
abnormalities associated with selective, 
naturally occurring physical damage to the 
brain. This has provided advances in cog-
nitive psychology, but any application to 
political science is remote. Similarly, stud-
ies of universals in animal behavior have 
recently advanced rapidly through a com-
bination of extensive selective breeding 
and the use of gene knockout and splicing 
technologies. For obvious ethical reasons, 
these techniques will continue to be un-
available for human behavioral research; 
consequently, investigation of human ge-
netic behavioral universals is far less acces-
sible for empirical research and unlikely to 
yield its answers quickly or easily.
Some empirical work on the biological 
causes of naturally occurring variation in 
politically relevant human behavior has 
been conducted. In 1986, Douglas Mad-
sen published a groundbreaking study of 
the role of serotonin in dominance behav-
ior. At virtually the same time, a team of 
researchers led by Lindon Eaves and Nich-
olas Martin added a short battery of po-
litical and social attitude items known as 
the Wilson-Patterson Inventory to a long 
set of mental health, personality, and ad-
dictive behavior questions that were be-
ing presented to >60,000 respondents in 
a survey of twins and their family mem-
bers. Using the classic twin design, their 
analysis of these data (Martin et al. 1986) 
indicated that a surprisingly large portion 
of variance in attitudes is traceable to ge-
netic forces. This finding should have sent 
shock waves through political science, but 
instead it remained virtually unknown. 
In the 20 years since, political science has 
seen almost no published empirical work 
that followed up on either the clear indi-
cation of a physiology of political behavior 
reported by Madsen (1986) or the clear evi-
dence of a genetic basis for political beliefs 
reported by Martin et al. (1986).
In the past few years, this has begun to 
change. Schrieber’s (2005) dissertation uti-
lizing functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) studies of brain activity during 
political cognition provided evidence that 
differences between political sophisticates 
and political novices arise from their use 
of different neural substrates and won the 
annual political psychology award for best 
dissertation. Alford et al. (2005) reanalyzed 
the twin data gathered by Eaves and Mar-
tin, expanding the coverage of ideology 
to include an analysis of the heritability 
of party identification. Fowler et al. (2006) 
conducted a twin study demonstrating the 
heritability of variations in levels of polit-
ical turnout. Hatemi et al. (2007c) identi-
fied the indirect connection of genetics to 
vote choice. McDermott and colleagues 
(Johnson et al. 2006) investigated the ef-
fects of neurotransmitter levels on play in 
simulated games. Orbell et al. (2004) and 
Axelrod & Hammond (2006) utilized sim-
ulations to model the implications of evo-
lution for political variables. And studies 
informed by a biological conception of po-
litical behavior, including notable publica-
tions by Ostrom (1998), Marcus (Marcus et 
al. 2000), and Lodge & Taber (2005), have 
found an increasingly wide audience.
We are confident that this recent, decid-
edly empirical variant of biopolitics will 
flourish as political scientists become in-
creasingly aware that biology does not 
equate with either universalism or deter-
minism. This is not to say that a more bi-
ological turn in political science would 
come without cost. The first step is merely 
educating political scientists on modern 
genetic and biological theory. This re-edu-
cation process strikes some political scien-
tists as daunting, but this perception must 
be fought. Previous generations of politi-
cal scientists have gone outside their dis-
cipline to become conversant in first lin-
ear algebra and later calculus in order to 
conduct research in behavioralism and ra-
tional choice, respectively. A comparable 
commitment to the study of biology is ad-
equate to conduct research on genetics and 
politics. The standard approach in the hard 
sciences includes large teams of individ-
uals with diverse skills; methodologists, 
Twin design: compar-
ing the resemblance of 
monozygotic and dizy-
gotic twins to estimate 
genetic and environ-
mental components of 
variance
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bench geneticists, theorists, data collectors, 
neuroscientists, and psychophysiologists 
frequently come together to conduct bio-
logically informed social (but to this point 
rarely political) science. It is unrealistic and 
unnecessary to expect political scientists to 
obtain advanced degrees in biology, but 
they can learn enough to converse appro-
priately with the hard scientists on inter-
disciplinary teams.
Fortunately, some of this research, no-
tably in behavior genetics, utilizes research 
skills quite familiar to traditional political 
behavioralists. Paper-and-pencil surveys, 
correlation analysis, and linear regres-
sion were all pioneered by Sir Francis Gal-
ton, the founding father of behavior ge-
netics. Even today, most work in behavior 
genetics, much to the dismay of “wet” ge-
neticists, continues to focus on paper-and-
pencil reports and essentially correlational 
statistical analysis (albeit of a far more ad-
vanced variety). Moreover, political sci-
entists can bring to the table fascinating 
questions, precise descriptions of political 
phenotypes, detailed understanding of en-
vironmental influences, and a willingness 
to work with scholars in the life sciences 
toward the goal of producing quality em-
pirical research that integrates genetics 
and the environment to assess the funda-
mental links running from genes through 
the brain to behavior.
A critical mass of political scientists 
possessing a working knowledge of biol-
ogy is necessary, but not sufficient, since 
data availability would still be a concern. 
In contrast to the laudable norm of data 
sharing in political science—of which the 
National Election Studies and the vast po-
litical science holdings at the Interuniver-
sity Consortium for Political and Social Re-
search (ICPSR) are prime examples—data 
sets developed within behavior genetics 
have been almost exclusively viewed as 
the private property of their initial prin-
cipal investigators. There is no archive 
for such data, and we are aware of only a 
single publicly available twin study data 
set that contains political or social vari-
ables. Empirical social scientists obviously 
need data to move forward, and data on 
the relevance of genetics to politics are in 
short supply. Fortunately, progress is be-
ing made on this front. The National Sci-
ence Foundation recently awarded a grant 
to a team of political scientists and behav-
ior geneticists (John Hibbing, John Alford, 
Kevin Smith, Peter Hatemi, Lindon Eaves, 
Nicholas Martin, Robert Krueger, and Car-
oline Funk), whose detailed survey of the 
political attitudes and behaviors of >1000 
twins will be available for widespread 
scholarly use by late 2009. This will be the 
first time political scientists have unfet-
tered access to twin studies and the first 
time a twin study asks more than cursory 
questions about politics (party identifica-
tion, participation, and selected, dichoto-
mous positions on issues). Additional data 
sets may well be generated by other col-
laborative teams. Interactions between po-
litical scientists and behavior geneticists 
are now under way in places as diverse as 
Virginia, Minnesota, Southern California, 
Canada, Sweden, and Australia.
While the practical issues discussed 
above have clearly slowed the growth of 
empirical biopolitics, an additional con-
straint has been ideological. Reaction to 
work in this area frequently betokens a 
visceral distaste: “Isn’t that what eugen-
ics was all about?” or even more directly 
“Isn’t that what leads to Nazi Germany?” 
Exploring a link between genes and vari-
able human traits raises a sensitive issue, 
and like the public uneasiness with evolu-
tion, it must be faced directly if the social 
sciences are to make any contribution to 
the consilience revolution. Science is about 
facts, and not just the comfortable facts—
or, even worse, the dressing up of hope-
ful fictions as established facts. What was 
and is wrong about social eugenics and its 
more extreme expression in selective geno-
cide is that the actions taken were and are 
morally wrong. Mass killing or steriliza-
tion is not wrong because it is mistaken 
about genetic facts, nor does it become 
right if it is based on accurate genetic facts.
The argument that establishing a ge-
netic influence on a trait directly enables 
genocide is also questionable. The science 
of genetics is new. Genocide appears to be 
Phenotype: observed 
characteristic result-
ing from the combined 
effects of genes and 
environment
Environment: all of 
the context in which or-
ganisms reside
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nearly as old as modern hominids. Serving 
as the latest in a long line of excuses for in-
humanity is not the same thing as being a 
cause of inhumanity. Nor is it the case that 
science is the final arbiter of what the pub-
lic construes as facts. A plurality of adults 
in the United States refuses to believe that 
humans and chimps share a common an-
cestor, even though human speciation by 
natural selection clearly qualifies as a scien-
tific fact and even though the United States 
is one of the most literate and proscience 
countries in the world. Although we regret 
the tendency of many to want to hide from 
the possibility of a role for genes in explain-
ing human behavioral differences, we are 
not surprised by either the belief itself or 
its emotional intensity and tenacity in the 
face of empirical evidence. We believe that 
some people are genetically predisposed 
to cognitive structures that make the biol-
ogy of human behavior in whatever form 
discomforting (“after all, biology is what 
makes animals animals but it is clearly 
something beyond biology that makes hu-
mans humans”) whereas others are genet-
ically predisposed to cognitive structures 
that leave them wondering what all the 
fuss is about (“after all, we are just slightly 
less hairy bonobos, are we not?”).
 
An Example of Empirical Biopolitics:  
The Classic Twin Design
It is important to move beyond mere as-
sessment of the role of genetics to explica-
tion of the nature of that role, but, as dis-
cussed above, for the near future the most 
accessible data for the empirical study of 
biology and politics will come from classic 
twin studies. As data become more widely 
accessible and interaction with behavior ge-
neticists increases, political scientists will 
need at least a rudimentary sense of the de-
sign, logic, and pitfalls of the twin design, if 
only to be reasonably informed consumers. 
What follows is a brief synopsis—with cita-
tions to more in-depth coverage for those 
who wish to be more than consumers.
Behavior geneticists typically divide in-
fluences on an individual trait, whether it 
is a political attitude or a physical charac-
teristic, into two broad groups—heredity 
(H) and environment (E). The total vari-
ation in a trait can thus be represented as 
the sum H + E. Heredity is the impact of 
genetic inheritance on trait variation. In 
the case of a physical characteristic such as 
adult height, this would be the proportion 
of the total variation in height across indi-
viduals that is due to the variation across 
individuals in the multiple genes that con-
trol height. For any one individual, the 
source of this genetic influence is rela-
tively well defined, as on average 50% of 
our genes come from our mother and 50% 
come from our father. This leads to the fact 
that biological children of tall parents are 
more likely to be tall than are the biolog-
ical children of short parents, although 
even for a relatively straightforward addi-
tive physical trait such as height, the rela-
tionship is far from determinative.
Environment includes all of the nonge-
netic external factors that influence trait 
variation across a population. These in-
fluences range broadly from the earli-
est biological environment of the womb, 
to the physical environment of a child-
hood house, to the social environment of 
the adult workplace. In the case of adult 
height, some of the obvious environmen-
tal factors are prenatal nutrition, the ade-
quacy of childhood and adolescent diet, 
and exposure to chemical agents that can 
inhibit growth. Environmental influences 
can be divided further into two subcatego-
ries: the shared environment and the un-
shared, or unique, environment.
Shared environment is all of the shared 
external influences that we would typi-
cally think of as leading to trait similarity 
between individuals. Siblings, for exam-
ple, might share similar childhood envi-
ronments, including similar parental in-
teractions, a similar physical environment, 
and similar nutrition. If the siblings hap-
pen to be twins, they would also share a 
more similar prenatal environment. In the 
case of adult height, a shared environmen-
tal factor, such as a regional diet limited in 
protein and specific nutrients, could lead 
to similarity in height across the entire 
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population of a region (e.g., North Korea). 
The unshared environment, in contrast, is 
composed of all the distinctive external in-
fluences that we would typically think of 
as leading to trait dissimilarity across indi-
viduals. Although much of the early child-
hood environment, for example, is similar 
across siblings, much is nonetheless vari-
able. Siblings differ in diet, disease expo-
sure, peer influences, and a host of other 
experiences. With the shift to adult life, the 
share of unique influences on siblings in-
creases sharply, as peer, workplace, fam-
ily, and physical settings typically diverge. 
Thus, the tools of behavior geneticists of-
fer a method for estimating not only the 
degree of heritability but also the relative 
contributions of different components of 
the environment.
The leverage to accomplish these im-
portant feats is provided by the existence 
of two fundamentally different types of 
twin pairs, one type genetically identical 
and the other sharing just 50% of their ge-
netic heritage. Twins provide a power-
ful “natural experiment” by introducing 
known genetic variation into analyses of 
the sources of trait variability. Observing 
the political similarity of parents and chil-
dren, as is common in political science re-
search, does not offer this same leverage 
because all nonadopted children share 50% 
of their genetic heritage with each biologi-
cal parent. By shifting the focus from the 
similarity between parents and offspring 
to the similarity between twins, research-
ers can take advantage of the fact that 
twins vary in known ways in the degree 
of their genetic correlation. This variance 
in genetic similarity derives from the exis-
tence of two distinct types of twins: mono-
zygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ). MZ (fre-
quently but imprecisely called identical) 
twins develop from a single egg fertilized 
by a single sperm, and they share an iden-
tical genetic code. DZ (frequently but er-
roneously called fraternal) twins develop 
from two separate eggs fertilized by two 
separate sperm; they are in effect simply 
two siblings who happen to be born nearly 
simultaneously. As such, DZ twins share 
on average 50% of genetic material, the 
same amount as any other pair of biolog-
ical siblings.
The classic twin design is built on the 
assumption that the effect of genetics is 
measurably distinct for MZ and DZ twins, 
whereas the effect of the environment is 
equivalent or at least randomly distributed 
around equivalence. This crucial equal-en-
vironments assumption is open to chal-
lenge. If, compared to DZ twins, MZ twins 
not only share more genetic alleles but also 
share more environmental experiences, 
attributing the differences between MZ 
and DZ twins to heritability would over-
estimate the effects of genetics. Thus, the 
equal-environments assumption has been 
subjected to sustained and varied inves-
tigation. We do not review this extensive 
literature here (for more information, see 
Scarr & Carter-Saltzman 1979; Bouchard et 
al. 1990; Plomin 1990; Kendler et al. 1993; 
Plomin et al. 2001; Bouchard & McGue 
2003; Horwitz et al. 2003; Richardson & 
Norgate 2005; Hatemi 2007, ch. 3; Charney 
2008), but the central conclusion of empir-
ical research is that violations of the equal-
environments assumption are limited and 
often inconsequential.
Given the genetic differences and en-
vironmental similarities of the two types 
of twins, for any trait that is partly heri-
table, the tendency for MZ twins to share 
that characteristic should be stronger than 
the tendency for DZ twins to share that 
characteristic. In contrast, characteristics 
that arise purely from the environment, 
whether shared by the twins (as would 
typically be the case for parental socializa-
tion) or not shared by the twins (as would 
be the case for many adult experiences), 
should not generate any significantly dif-
ferent patterns when we contrast MZ and 
DZ twins (see Eaves et al. 1989, 1997; Plo-
min et al. 2001 for thorough discussions of 
the relevant statistical techniques). This is 
the basic and powerful concept behind the 
classic twin design.
Rudimentary assessment of the role of 
genetics is possible by subtracting the cor-
relation for DZ pairs from the correlation 
MZ: monozygotic 
(“identical”) twins
DZ: dizygotic (“frater-
nal”) twins
Equal environments 
assumption: in twin 
studies, the assump-
tion that environments 
are equally similar for 
monozygotic and for di-
zygotic twins
Allele: the specific ver-
sion of a gene
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for MZ pairs and then doubling the dif-
ference (since the genetic similarity of MZ 
twins is twice that of DZ twins). Shared 
environment can be estimated by dou-
bling the correlation for DZ pairs and then 
subtracting the correlation for MZ pairs. 
Unshared environment is generally con-
sidered to be the remainder (1 – MZ), al-
though it is important to note that this fig-
ure actually includes the effect of unshared 
environment as well as the error term. But 
the preferred methodology for estimating 
effects involves structural equation mod-
els. State-of-the-art analyses employ Cho-
lesky decomposition techniques, which, 
unlike the old polychoric correlation pro-
cedures, make it possible to provide sig-
nificance tests, to account for mediating 
variables, and to engage in model testing 
and subsequent re-estimation of the rela-
tionships once the proper model has been 
identified (Hatemi 2007, ch. 3). The typical 
designation in these structural equation 
models is A for (additive) genetics, C for 
shared or common environment, and E for 
unshared environment. Other models add 
a D term for interactive genetic effects. Still 
further elaborations on these basic models 
are possible and increasingly common.
How Can Genes Possibly Influence Life-
long Temperaments?
As mentioned, the classic twin design 
produces useful indications of a genetic in-
fluence on political attitudes but no sense 
of the processes that produce this connec-
tion. In this regard, the work of psycholo-
gists on the heritability of personality can 
serve as a template. In many ways, the con-
cerns of psychology with enduring tem-
peraments mirror those of political science, 
and both “personality” and “political ide-
ology” (the phrase political scientists ap-
ply to a cohesive collection of attitudes on 
issues) enjoyed early prominence among 
behavioralists in their respective disci-
plines. But evidence of a heritable compo-
nent of personality is more generally ac-
knowledged than is the case for ideology, 
and research to explicate this relationship 
in psychology has moved far ahead of re-
search in political science.
The evidence that personality is partly 
heritable is overwhelming. Taking the 
means of several estimates of the heritabil-
ity of the “Big Five” personality traits sug-
gests that extraversion has a heritability 
coefficient of around 0.53, agreeableness 
0.42, conscientiousness 0.46, emotional sta-
bility or neuroticism 0.49, and openness or 
curiosity 0.54 (computed from results col-
lected by Bouchard & McGue 2003, p. 23). 
The heritability of personality traits has 
even been observed in animal experiments, 
a context where environmental controls 
are possible to a much greater extent than 
with humans. For example, researchers 
have found that extraverted bird parents 
tend to have extraverted offspring even 
when those offspring have never seen their 
parents. Moreover, selective breeding over 
just three or four generations can produce 
significantly bolder or shyer birds (Drent 
et al. 2003; for a summary, see Gosling & 
John 1999). The notion that extraversion is 
genetic in birds but not in humans, even 
though many of the same neurotransmit-
ters relevant to extraversion (such as sero-
tonin and dopamine) are present in both 
birds and humans, stretches credulity.
Progress has been made in the next step 
of identifying the specific genes that are 
relevant to variations in personality traits. 
The best-known work involving human 
temperament is centered on serotonin, a 
neurotransmitter long known for its con-
nection to assertiveness on the one hand 
and certain types of depression on the 
other. Allelic variation in a gene known as 
5-HTT, which is associated with the reup-
take of serotonin from synapses (thus af-
fecting the availability of usable serotonin) 
has been associated with depressive be-
havior, especially if allelic variation is in-
teracted with previous environmental ex-
periences such as an abusive childhood 
(Caspi et al. 2003). In fact, a whole class 
of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs), including Prozac, has grown up 
around the connection of serotonin trans-
port to social behavior. To be sure, some 
results on the specific genes involved with 
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personality have not been replicated, and 
confusion is often apparent (van Gestel & 
van Broeckhoven 2003); but social behav-
ior is amazingly complex, and research in 
this area is only beginning to gain momen-
tum. It will take time to establish the de-
tails, but few if any scientists would insist 
that neurotransmitters such as serotonin, 
dopamine, vasopressin, and oxytocin are 
irrelevant to personality, and equally few 
would claim that the manufacture, trans-
port, and reception of these neurotransmit-
ters has no basis whatsoever in genetics. 
What remains is the difficult but exciting 
work of connecting genes to behavior, a 
connection that involves the interaction of 
thousands of genes, not to mention further 
interactions of those genes with environ-
mental triggers and modifiers.
So the personality traits that play such 
a crucial role in psychology have been es-
tablished as partially genetic, and work 
is well under way in specifying the genes 
that are relevant and the particular alleles 
predisposing an individual toward either 
risk-taking or extreme caution, buoyancy 
or despondence. Research in this area is an 
increasingly important part of psychology, 
and laypeople do not tend to have much 
difficulty accepting that personal temper-
ament is partially rooted in genetics. Per-
sonality traits seem to be relatively perma-
nent and also to directly involve behaviors. 
Those who are extraverted tend to behave 
differently at parties than those who are 
introverted, and they tend to do so at all 
stages of life. Reactions to personal situa-
tions, including fear and empathy, seem 
spontaneous and emotionally powerful, 
just as might be expected if their basis is 
in the chemicals flowing through various 
components of the limbic system. In short, 
the intense, immediate reactions to events 
in people’s personal lives make it rela-
tively easy to accept that genes could play 
an important role in shaping personality, 
pushing some people toward hair-trigger 
tempers and others toward diffidence in 
the face of affronts.
Political temperament is an obvious po-
litical parallel to personality, but there are 
also some important distinctions. After 
all, it is often asserted that personality in-
volves behavior whereas political and so-
cial attitudes are just that—attitudes. They 
can be characterized as preferences for the 
manner in which group life should be con-
ducted. At first blush, these preferences 
seem distinct from the heavily emotive, 
behavior-inducing features of personal-
ity. Compared to personal temperament, 
political attitudes are more cognitive and 
less limbic, are they not? They are highly 
changeable and subject to life’s vicissi-
tudes, are they not? They are subscribed 
to casually and only peripheral to the core 
of our being, are they not? If these are ac-
curate perceptions of political attitudes, it 
makes sense to conceptualize and to study 
them the way political scientists have done 
for decades: as purely environmentally 
contingent epiphenomena. Seen from this 
vantage point, it is unsurprising and even 
sensible that political scientists would have 
turned to behavioralism to understand the 
source of political attitudes.
But this view of political attitudes is 
built on intuition rather than science. Atti-
tudes may feel as though they are cognitive 
responses to our experiences and, more-
over, we may be more comfortable believ-
ing that our political attitudes are the ra-
tional consequences of our individualized 
environment, but feelings and desires are 
not the crux of the matter. Is there evidence 
that neurotransmitters, emotions, chemi-
cals, and genetics are irrelevant to political 
temperament? The answer is no, and upon 
closer reflection, the basis for positing a ma-
jor difference between the personal and the 
political begins to crumble.
Any assertion that politics is devoid of 
emotion is inconsistent with even casual 
observation of the political world. Just as 
some people respond emotively to per-
sonal events whereas others are more la-
conic, similar distinctions are clearly ev-
ident in the political world, where the 
politically intense reside cheek by jowl 
with political apathetics. Fascinating re-
cent work has been done on the extent to 
which emotional reactions characterize 
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people’s response to political stimuli (Mar-
cus et al. 2000, Lodge & Taber 2005, Sch-
reiber 2005, Westen et al. 2006). Attitudes 
on individual political issues may vary 
substantially over the course of a lifetime 
(see Fiorina 1981), but ideological frame-
works are more consistent over time, and 
there may be even more stability when it 
comes to positions on bedrock principles 
concerning the organization of group life 
(attitudes toward out-groups, toward pun-
ishment of norm violators, toward repro-
ductive matters, and toward the nature of 
the human condition).
Though it is unquestionably true that 
attitudes toward mass-scale politics are, 
from an evolutionary point of view, quite 
recent, this does not mean that a deeper, 
even genetic basis is impossible. Read-
ing and writing have been practiced by a 
significant portion of the world’s popula-
tion for only a few generations, yet specific 
genes have been identified that correlate 
with reading performance. Quite prob-
ably, the cognitively novel processes in-
volved with reading and writing coopted 
biological systems that originally evolved 
for other purposes, but this does not obvi-
ate the fact that individuals with a particu-
lar allele on chromosome 6 are more likely 
to suffer from dyslexia. Genes can matter 
even when adaptation for the trait of inter-
est is not involved. This is true of reading 
and it is likely true of politics.
Even so, one reason political scientists 
have been slow to accept biological evi-
dence may be that they study an evolution-
arily recent and uniquely human subject: 
mass-scale politics. Animal corollaries for 
all kinds of social behaviors can be found, 
most obviously among higher-order pri-
mates (see de Waal 1982, 1996) but also in 
the insect world (Wilson 1975, Whitfield et 
al. 2003, Robinson 2004), and although these 
social behaviors are sometimes referred to 
as political—especially when they involve 
dominance hierarchies and collective deci-
sions—they are quite distinct from mass-
scale politics. Nonhuman animals never 
cease to surprise, but there is no existing ev-
idence that any species other than Homo sa-
piens cares about social norms, rules, and 
behaviors when the consequences of these 
norms, rules, and behaviors do not affect 
the organism’s immediate bailiwick. Hu-
mans’ ability to engage in abstract thought 
has created an interesting situation, but the 
fact that a thought is abstract does not mean 
people have only weak attachment to it.
If the recent revolution in neuroscience 
has taught us anything, it is that activity by 
the cortex does not override limbic activ-
ity but is integrated with it (LeDoux 1996, 
2002). Politics, therefore, contrary to the in-
stincts of laypeople and to the untested as-
sumptions of political scientists, is certainly 
a likely candidate for being shaped in part 
by limbic activity, which in turn is known 
to be shaped by genes. Moreover, the no-
tion that the cortex is the only part of hu-
man anatomy not subject to the laws of evo-
lution is badly mistaken. Recent research 
indicates that even the most unemotional 
of decisions, such as whether two digits 
should be added or subtracted, sets off dis-
tinct brain activation patterns (Haynes et al. 
2007). It appears that subtle, nonemotional 
decisions have biological markers, and if 
they have biological markers, they may also 
have genetic correlates. Not all cortices are 
born equal, and genes are undoubtedly rel-
evant to these variations.
Political scientists’ belief that politics 
is sui generis is both right and wrong. It is 
right in the sense that mass-scale politics is 
evolutionarily recent and uniquely human, 
but it is wrong in the sense that politics is 
generated by essentially the same brain 
and the same genome that existed prior to 
the advent of mass-scale social life. Recent 
evidence indicates that positive genetic 
selection does not need the hundreds of 
thousands of years that were once thought 
to be necessary (Rockman et al. 2005), but 
the hypothesis that existing machinery has 
been expropriated for shifting situations 
over the past 5000–10,000 years remains 
more likely than that completely original 
neural/biological machinery evolved dur-
ing that timespan.
The ability of genes to affect political be-
liefs is easier to understand with some ap-
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preciation of modern genetics. When ana-
lyzing his sweet peas, Mendel happened 
to select traits (such as whether the flow-
ers were purple or white and whether the 
seeds were wrinkled or smooth) that are 
both monogenic and largely oblivious to 
common environmental forces. This was 
fortuitous in terms of establishing the basic 
building blocks of genetics but unfortunate 
in that most traits, and certainly most com-
plex behavioral traits, are polygenic and 
heavily contingent on the environment. If 
a political scientist’s knowledge of genetics 
ends with Mendel, that scholar will expect 
all genetic forces to be gross, determinis-
tic, and dichotomous, and it would be im-
possible to reconcile genetics with the gra-
dated, changeable, and environmentally 
shaped world of political attitudes.
A working knowledge of post-Mende-
lian genetics helps to reconcile the politi-
cal and the biological. Important individ-
ual genes such as 5-HTT, which is among 
the most studied in the entire human ge-
nome, at best account for 3%–4% of the 
variance in depressive tendencies (Caspi et 
al. 2003). Many, many genes are involved 
in serotonin production, transport, and re-
ception—and serotonin is just one of many 
neurotransmitters relevant to depression. 
The correlation of genes with behavioral 
traits is much more likely to be detected if 
genes are permitted to interact with doz-
ens of other genes (Comings et al. 2000). 
Complex traits tend to be configural rather 
than additive to the point that many genet-
ically based traits (such as genius) do not 
even run in families (Lykken 1998). More-
over, all these genes, as well as the config-
urations of which they are a part, interact 
with environmental forces to shape phe-
notypes such as obesity, schizophrenia, 
conscientiousness, and political attitudes. 
Geneticists do not use terms such as “de-
terminism” or “a gene for…” because that 
is not how genetics works.
The individuals most resistant to the role 
of genetics in social behavior seem to be 
those with the most misconceptions about 
genetics. Accepting a role for genetics does 
not require acceptance of the notion that all 
people are inherently violent (Ardrey 1961) 
or, alternatively, that all people are peace-
ful and only made violent by societal forces 
(Mead 1928; Rousseau 1946 [1762]). As evo-
lutionary psychologists are quick to point 
out, within species, evolution often has a 
homogenizing effect as adaptive alleles 
drive out nonadaptive ones, but within-spe-
cies morphs are common, and substantial 
variation, especially in those traits that are 
not directly and immediately connected to 
survival and reproduction, is likely. Impor-
tant polymorphisms are scattered through-
out the genome, and, after long ballyhooing 
the misleading fact that a high percentage 
of genes are identical across all humans and 
even across all higher-order primates, re-
cent biological research has now come to 
emphasize the extent and importance of 
those portions of the genome that do vary 
from person to person and from chimp to 
person (Hinds et al. 2006). Genes vary and 
people vary. Some people are more prone 
to violence than others, and this variability 
does nothing to diminish the role of genet-
ics in explaining human behavior—quite 
the contrary.
Genes do not demand bimodal distri-
butions in which some people are violent 
and others peaceful. The more genes that 
are involved in shaping a phenotype, the 
more continuous and normally distributed 
that phenotype will be. Contrast eye color 
and height. Although there are important 
exceptions (mostly green or gray), most 
people have either brown or blue eyes. Eye 
color is influenced by a very small number 
of genes, and the result is a non-normally 
distributed phenotype. The same cannot 
be said for height, a trait that is known to 
be influenced by an extremely large num-
ber of genes. Most people are of middling 
height, and a much smaller number are 
either extremely tall or extremely short. 
Complex social traits, including politi-
cal attitudes, are polygenic and therefore 
closer to the continuous world of height 
than the quasi-digital world of eye color. 
Subtle variation in political attitudes from 
one person to another is not a sign that ge-
netics is irrelevant to political attitudes. 
Polymorphism: a  
genetic locus with more 
than one allele
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Genes work probabilistically. To take one 
example, the so-called breast cancer gene 
does not mean every person with a specific 
allele at that genetic locus will get breast 
cancer—only that the odds of contracting 
breast cancer are increased by the posses-
sion of that allele.
One important reason for variations 
in behavior involves “promoter” regions 
that are just upstream from the protein-
coding gene. Identical genes with differ-
ent promoter regions will yield fundamen-
tally different behavioral patterns because 
the differential sensitivity of promoter re-
gions will lead the relevant gene to be ex-
pressed under different circumstances. 
Polymorphisms in these promoter regions 
are crucial to the behavioral variations that 
interest social scientists. A certain environ-
ment, such as a vigorous political discus-
sion, may stimulate one person but leave 
another nonplussed and a third disgusted, 
even as other situations could trigger dif-
ferent response patterns. Promoter regions 
are quite likely involved in this behavioral 
variation.
Finally, given the important role post-
Mendelian genetics grants to the environ-
ment, the fact that political attitudes some-
times change over the course of a person’s 
lifetime is not at all inconsistent with a po-
tential role for genetics. Genes leave plenty 
of room for a shifting environment (or de-
velopmental stages) to change phenotypic 
behavior. The only determinists in the 
world today are environmental determin-
ists. Geneticists go out of their way to point 
out that the alleged contrast between na-
ture and nurture is in actuality a chimera. 
Nature interacts with nurture to make us 
who we are. Geneticists believe pheno-
types—both physical and behavioral—are 
the result of G × E interactions (genetics 
interacting with environment). Traditional 
social scientists, unfortunately, cling to 
the belief that behavioral phenotypes are 
the result of E alone, a notion totally with-
out empirical foundation and increasingly 
anachronistic, even embarrassing.
But the fault does not lie entirely with 
political scientists. Behavior genetics is a 
more insular field than it should be, with 
close alliances primarily to those social sci-
entists working on mental disorders and 
addictive behavior—not coincidentally, ar-
eas that generate substantial support from 
funding sources. Data sets therefore rarely 
contain extensive information on political 
attitudes or behaviors, and they are typi-
cally proprietary and not widely dissemi-
nated. The few articles presenting evidence 
of a genetic influence on political and so-
cial attitudes tend to be atheoretical, with 
little in the way of explanation for how 
and why genes are relevant to politics—
explanation that is probably necessary if 
political scientists are to be persuaded.
Alternatives to the Classic Twin Design
The twin design remains the workhorse 
of behavior genetics, thanks to known dif-
ferences between MZ and DZ twins in de-
gree of genetic similarity, but other designs 
have grown in usage. Adoption studies, for 
example, make it possible to compare sib-
lings who share 50% of their genetic heri-
tage (nonadoptive siblings) and those who 
share 0% (adoptive siblings), or to com-
pare children with their adoptive as well 
as their biological parents. Both techniques 
have been used to good effect, although 
information on biological parents is often 
difficult to acquire. However, adoption 
studies in the area of political attitudes 
are virtually nonexistent and thus consti-
tute a fertile area for future research—with 
the caveat that such studies will be best 
when they involve adults. Twin research 
indicates that the heritability of political 
views does not become apparent until af-
ter age 20, when preferences begin to firm 
up (Bouchard & McGue 2003).
More progress has been made regarding 
a different approach to adding variation 
in genetic similarity: the extended-family 
model. When information is collected not 
only on twins but also on their parents, sib-
lings, and perhaps other relatives, statisti-
cal power is increased and several correc-
tions are possible (see Hatemi et al. 2007a). 
Locus: location in the 
genome
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Incorporating data from nontwin siblings 
and other relatives permits more accurate 
assessment of the environment (since non-
twin siblings presumably have roughly 
similar environments to their twin siblings 
once age corrections are applied), so data 
on the extended family, particularly when 
analyzed with the sophisticated structural 
equation modeling techniques now com-
mon in behavior genetics, have the po-
tential to extend understanding of the re-
lationship between genetics and political 
attitudes.
The techniques of behavior genetics, 
from simple correlations comparing the 
similarity of MZ and DZ twins to more 
complex structural equation models, are 
not completely foreign to those schol-
ars familiar with the statistical techniques 
commonly used in political science. In this 
sense, detailed political data on twins con-
stitute a valuable entry gate for political 
scientists eager to begin to apply the in-
sights of biology to research on politics. 
No immersion in the details of molecular 
genetics is required, and with fairly mini-
mal background work, it will be possible 
for many political scientists to confirm, ex-
tend, or modify existing, preliminary find-
ings on the degree to which political atti-
tudes (and behaviors) are influenced by 
genetic factors as opposed to either shared 
or unshared environmental forces.
Although this situation makes twin 
studies incredibly valuable, they have their 
limits. The real problem with twin studies 
is not the equal-environments assumption 
but the fact that they provide no informa-
tion on the identity of the specific genes or 
biological systems leading to a given phe-
notype. It is one thing to know that a given 
phenotype is roughly 45% heritable; it is 
quite another to know the specific genes 
involved, the association of these genes’ 
various alleles with phenotypic manifes-
tations, and the biological explanations for 
that association of alleles and phenotype. 
For this reason, research on genetics and 
politics cannot stop with assessments of 
heritability of the sort possible with twin 
studies and related procedures. Instead, 
DNA samples must be obtained so that in-
formation on specific alleles at candidate 
loci is available. Variation in these alleles 
is then assessed for correlation with phe-
notypes of interest in what is usually re-
ferred to as an association study.
For example, thanks to the availability 
of DNA samples drawn earlier on thou-
sands of subjects in Australia, we have be-
gun the process of determining if allelic 
variations in genes known to be involved 
with standard neurotransmitter systems, 
including the serotonin transport gene dis-
cussed above (5-HTT), are associated with 
variations in political beliefs. Twin studies 
are still viewed with suspicion by many in 
the social sciences, but if associations are 
found between variations in individual 
genes and political beliefs, it will be much 
more difficult for environmental determin-
ists to make their case. Although this type 
of bench genetic work requires more scien-
tific background than twin studies do, the 
rapidly decreasing cost of genetic analysis 
and the possibility of teaming up with ge-
neticists make this kind of research feasi-
ble for political scientists.
Allelic association studies require a pri-
ori, theoretically based knowledge of a lo-
cus suspected of being politically relevant. 
It is the allelic variation at this locus, af-
ter all, that is checked for correlation with 
phenotypic behavior. If, however, politics 
is genetic but driven by something other 
than the usual chemical suspects (e.g., se-
rotonin and dopamine), steps must be 
taken to identify the novel loci. Since large-
scale political behavior is not the same as 
small-scale social behavior, there is good 
reason to think that political phenotypes 
may be traceable to loci other than those 
connected to traditional personal tempera-
ments. In such a situation, linkage analysis 
is advised. Linkage analysis takes advan-
tage of the rapidly growing knowledge of 
the human genome. Thousands of marker 
alleles have been identified throughout 
the billions of nucleotide base pairs found 
in the chromosomes in each of our cells. 
These markers are checked for cosegrega-
tion with a trait of interest (e.g., intense 
Association study:  
determining if alleles are 
associated with particu-
lar phenotypes
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political feelings). This is done not because 
these marker alleles are thought to cause 
the phenotype (this would be a wild co-
incidence) but because, owing to patterns 
of genetic recombination, seemingly un-
related traits may cosegregate simply be-
cause genes relevant to those traits are lo-
cated in close proximity on our DNA. The 
closer two genes are, the more likely they 
are to vary together. By analyzing these 
patterns of cosegregation, it is possible to 
narrow the likely location of alleles rele-
vant to the phenotype of interest.
In a perfect world, twin studies indicate 
that a phenotypic trait is indeed partially 
genetic and that, therefore, additional 
analysis is advisable; linkage analysis is 
then employed to narrow the range of pos-
sible locations for relevant genes; and fi-
nally association studies determine the 
specific alleles at those targeted locations 
that seem to be associated with the phe-
notypic behaviors of interest in the first 
place. Of course, such an orderly progres-
sion rarely comes to pass, but it at least 
helps to illustrate the divergent strengths 
of twin studies, linkage analysis, and asso-
ciation studies.
In political science, the ultimate goal is 
not to engage in some sort of gene therapy 
in order to push everyone toward a cer-
tain political ideology but rather simply 
to understand the factors that shape politi-
cal attitudes and behaviors. Identifying the 
genes and alleles involved is one means 
toward the end of understanding these 
larger biological processes. In this sense, 
locating genes is not much more than a 
helpful step on the road to understanding 
the biological explanation for politically 
relevant predispositions. Accordingly, one 
goal of our research group, consistent with 
a larger movement in political psychology, 
is to understand the psychophysiology of 
politics. Do liberals and conservatives have 
different physiological reactions to polit-
ical stimuli? Do they have different phys-
iological reactions to nonpolitical stimuli? 
Can the ideological leanings of individuals 
be predicted merely by measuring (or ma-
nipulating) chemicals in the body?
Integrating Political Science
Political scientists’ recent exposure to a 
possible role of genetics in shaping political 
attitudes as well as other political traits has 
yet to significantly alter the basic thrust of 
their empirical research. To this point, the 
topic has been treated as a curiosity. This 
is understandable, but it is important to 
move to the next step, where serious tests 
of serious hypotheses are performed by a 
broad spectrum of scholars. Sets of genes 
could affect politics in so many different 
ways. There could be genes pushing indi-
viduals toward being intensely political or 
indifferent to politics. Genes could influ-
ence certain individuals to possess views 
traditionally associated with the politi-
cal right (i.e., wariness of out-groups and 
devotion to established, unchanging val-
ues) and others to possess views tradition-
ally associated with the political left. Cer-
tain suites of genes might encourage some 
people to rebel against their political envi-
ronment and others to absorb the precise 
political timbre of the world around them. 
Then again, there may be some genes that 
predispose individuals toward certain sets 
of beliefs. Maybe those with alleles that 
yield more usable testosterone are more 
likely to adopt libertarian beliefs (“I will 
not be led”), and maybe those with alleles 
that yield more oxytocin—which has been 
associated with trusting behavior (Kos-
feld et al. 2005)—are more likely to join 
groups or to support redistributive poli-
cies. Maybe only a fraction of the popula-
tion is genetically predisposed one way or 
the other and the remainder of the popula-
tion is shaped exclusively by environmen-
tal forces. Maybe only certain types of po-
litical variables are influenced by genetics. 
For example, our earlier research found 
that party identification was almost com-
pletely driven by environmental forces, a 
finding that has been confirmed by subse-
quent research (PK Hatemi, LJ Eaves, SE 
Medland, KL Morley, NG Martin, unpub-
lished manuscript). Other research by Ha-
temi reveals that vote choice is heritable, 
but largely indirectly, through attitudes to-
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ward issues (Hatemi et al. 2007b). These 
findings are perfectly consistent with a ge-
netic explanation because the political par-
ties and candidates present in a particular 
country at a particular time are ephem-
eral, whereas opinions on matters relating 
to the organization of group life are rela-
tively timeless.
This budding research agenda in polit-
ical genetics fits nicely with revived inter-
est in political ideology as something more 
than political scientists’ traditional concep-
tion; that is, more than just a set of specific 
issue-beliefs that fit together or the ability 
to identify currently employed ideologi-
cal terms such as liberal or conservative 
(Converse 1964). Ideology should instead 
be seen as a set of bedrock predispositions 
toward group life, regardless of when or 
where the group exists (Jost 2006). The lit-
erature connecting personality and politi-
cal beliefs is extensive and controversial 
(Adorno et al. 1950; McClosky 1958; Alte-
meyer 1981, 1996; Caprara et al. 1999; Jost 
et al. 2003; Caprara et al. 2006; Block & 
Block 2005), partially because much of it 
seems to paint one ideology (conservatism) 
in a bad light. If personal temperament 
and political temperament are both par-
tially genetic, the natural question becomes 
whether they both spring from the same 
biological systems and ultimately from the 
same genes. An alternative possibility is 
that the manner in which people organize 
and conduct their personal lives is distinct 
from their preferences for the organization 
and conduct of mass-scale group life—that 
is, politics. The larger point is that deter-
mining the actual route connecting genes 
and politics will take a good deal of work 
and a willingness of additional political 
scientists to avail themselves of improved 
methodologies and improved data to iden-
tify the ultimate sources of political beliefs 
(for an outline of such a research agenda, 
see Carmen 2007).
Much of who we are as human beings 
is shaped by genetics. Traits such as height 
and weight, personality, mental health, oc-
cupational satisfaction, addictive behav-
iors, religious beliefs, and political and 
social attitudes have all been found to be 
heritable, though of course at different lev-
els. A recent Danish study put the genetic 
contribution of height at 0.81 for females 
and 0.69 for males; body fat at 0.59 for fe-
males and 0.63 for males; and waist cir-
cumference at 0.48 for females and 0.61 for 
males (Schousboe et al. 2004). Bouchard 
& McGue’s (2003) compilation of sev-
eral twin studies suggests the heritability 
of general intelligence to be around 0.50, 
with some estimates as high as 0.70. They 
also report that perceptual speed and ac-
curacy seem to be somewhat more heri-
table (0.64) than verbal ability (0.48) and 
memory (also 0.48). As alluded to earlier, 
personality traits such as those constitut-
ing the Big Five tend to be heritable in the 
range of 0.4–0.5. A study by McCourt et 
al. (1999) finds right-wing authoritarian-
ism to be heritable at approximately the 
same level as each of the Big Five traits. 
Similar to party affiliation, religious affil-
iation yields a heritability coefficient that 
approaches zero. Affiliation with a group 
is not genetic but the degree of religiosity 
(as measured by frequency of church at-
tendance) is strongly heritable, perhaps as 
much as 0.42 (Maes et al. 1999). Specific re-
ligious beliefs, such as Sabbath observance 
and accepting the Bible as truth, range in 
heritability from 0.25 to 0.35 (Martin et al. 
1986). The extent to which people have in-
terests that are artistic (0.44), social (0.50), 
enterprising (0.52), conventional (0.54), 
and realistic (0.58) is also solidly heritable, 
at least as measured by the traditional Fal-
coner method employing twins reared to-
gether (Betsworth et al. 1994). Bachner-
Melman et al. (2005) have even found an 
association between specific alleles (rele-
vant to the vasopressin and serotonin sys-
tems) and interest in creative dance, on the 
one hand, as opposed to more traditional 
athletics on the other.
The precise figures mentioned above 
should be treated with caution, but the fact 
is an extraordinary range of human traits 
have a basis in genetics. Of most interest 
to political scientists is that social and po-
litical attitudes are included in this range 
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and are about as heritable as most standard 
personality traits. And the same may be 
true for social and political behaviors. Re-
cent research (Fowler et al. 2006) indicates 
that actual voter turnout (not just self-re-
ported turnout) is strongly heritable. Re-
search under way should determine the 
extent to which other political behaviors, 
such as discussing politics, working in 
campaigns, and joining organizations, are 
heritable. Regarding social as opposed to 
purely political behavior, self-reported al-
truism is heritable (see Rushton et al. 1986), 
and ongoing research should indicate if ac-
tual altruism—as well as tendencies toward 
taking risks, deferring gratification, and en-
gaging in altruistic punishment, as mea-
sured by behavior in economic games—is 
heritable. Given the range of traits that are 
heritable, it would be surprising if these so-
cial and political behaviors are not herita-
ble as well (Baschetti 2007). The real ques-
tion pertains to the biological basis for this 
established heritability.
 
Implications
Specifying the degree to which various 
political concepts are heritable has impor-
tant implications for virtually all subfields 
of political science. Obviously, for those 
who study individual-level political be-
havior, understanding the source of behav-
iors as well as the attitudes on which those 
behaviors are presumably based will mat-
ter a good deal. Attitudes that are herita-
ble have been shown to be more resistant 
to change, to be held more strongly, and 
to be more likely a basis for the choices we 
make (see Tesser 1993). Knowing the types 
of issues that tend to generate heritable at-
titudes, therefore, will help to explain vari-
ations across those attitudes in the extent to 
which they are salient or not, intensely held 
or not, easy or hard (see Carmines & Stim-
son 1980). It will also broaden perspective 
on the source of politics. Whereas previ-
ously the debate tended to be whether var-
ious features were socialized early or ac-
quired late, the issue now becomes whether 
features are inherited, socialized, or influ-
enced by unique features of the environ-
ment. Incorporating genetics will indicate 
the areas where the socialization efforts of 
parents are and are not likely to pay off.
These individual-level implications for 
students of political behavior are fairly ob-
vious. Less obvious but no less noteworthy 
are the potential implications for students 
of institutions, rational choice, international 
relations, and comparative politics. Deter-
mination of the degree to which, as well as 
the manner by which, genetics shapes pol-
itics would allow institutionalists a better 
feel for the conditions under which insti-
tutions can shape politics. The creation of 
institutions is an attempt to alter the envi-
ronment. Add a constable to chaos and be-
havior will be modified. Recognizing that 
genetic predispositions will lead some peo-
ple to react differently than others in the 
face of the same institution has the poten-
tial to allow institutional designers to fine-
tune their work in hopes of achieving a 
better result—or at least suggests the dif-
ficulties of successful institutional design. 
Given genetic diversity, it is fair to con-
clude that one size does not fit all.
Rational choice scholars know that in-
dividuals have different preferences for 
avoiding risks, for experiencing new 
things, for trying to persuade others to 
change their preferences, and perhaps for 
substantive matters such as a deep suspi-
cion of out-groups or the promotion of un-
changing traditional values. The assump-
tion that preferences are merely a rational 
reflection of the individual’s situation is 
highly questionable, and the assumption 
that preferences can be inferred from be-
havior leads in an endless circle. With the 
recognition of genetics as a source of pref-
erences, both of those assumptions become 
unnecessary.
With regard to international relations, 
conflict can be seen as arising not just be-
cause of environmental factors but also 
from varying innate predispositions on the 
part of the potential combatants. Adopting 
a biological orientation does not require 
adopting the belief that all humans are in-
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herently violent or, conversely, inherently 
peaceful (for explication, see Sapolsky 
2006); such claims are badly misguided. 
Traits such as a proclivity toward violence 
vary dramatically from person to person, 
from context to context, and from gene 
pool to gene pool. Some people are more 
violent than others. This is true of their 
tendency toward violence in their personal 
lives (e.g., getting involved in a bar fight) 
as well as of their tendency to advocate 
collective violence against an out-group 
(e.g., starting or supporting a war fought 
by others). Interestingly, the correlation 
between these two different orientations to 
violence may be quite weak.
Comparative politics could be greatly 
assisted by recognition of the fact that 
groups of people are genetically distinct 
from other groups of people. To provide a 
concrete illustration, we reference diversity 
of an important gene in the dopaminer-
gic system. Imbalances in the neurotrans-
mitter dopamine have been implicated in 
Parkinson’s disease as well as in several 
behaviors including novelty-seeking. The 
relevant gene is called DRD4 because it is 
instrumental in laying down the D4 class 
of dopamine receptors. An insufficient 
supply of these receptors would minimize 
the effect of any dopamine that is present, 
since all the dopamine in the world will 
not matter to a biological system incapable 
of receiving that dopamine. Previous work 
has found evidence that, compared to 
those with short alleles, individuals with 
one or two long alleles of DRD4 are more 
likely to exhibit risk-taking behavior, dis-
play behavior, and perhaps attention def-
icit disorder (Chen et al. 1999, Harpend-
ing & Cochran 2002, Ding et al. 2002). 
There is substantial variation from group 
to group in the presence of these long al-
leles (defined here as at least seven repeats 
of a key 48-nucleotide base-pair sequence 
in exon III). Data on the frequency of long 
alleles have been reported for 39 different 
groups (Chen et al. 1999) and range from 
a high of 78% for the Ticuna and Guahibo 
peoples of Colombia to a low of 4% for the 
Atayal of Taiwan, followed closely by the 
Han (China) and Samoans, both at just 5%. 
Continent-by-continent breakdowns reveal 
interesting patterns. African and Euro-
pean groups are on average quite similar, 
with the four African groups in the sam-
ple (the Biaka, the Mbuti, the San, and the 
Bantu) averaging 21% long alleles and the 
five European groups (Sardinians, Danes, 
Swedes, Spaniards, and a mixed European 
sample from the United States) averaging 
15%. Some African groups, such as the San, 
have fewer long alleles (9%) than some Eu-
ropean groups, such as the Swedes (19%). 
But the biggest variations can be seen be-
tween the East Asian groups, with a mean 
of 9% (just 6% if the Malay are excluded), 
and the South American groups, with a 
mean of 69%.
These allelic differences across groups 
are immense and we can say with confi-
dence that they are not coincidental. Cer-
tain groups are genetically different from 
other groups. Although such a statement 
may elicit gasps in some quarters, it is far 
from surprising; any time breeding pop-
ulations are kept separate for numerous 
generations, differences will be evident. 
The obvious question of interest is whether 
this undeniable genetic variation across 
groups has any influence at all on group 
behavior. Given that research in this area 
is normatively charged, we should state 
clearly that we are not claiming that the Ti-
cuna and Atayal people behave differently 
because of genetic differences. Genes are 
expressed differently in different environ-
mental contexts, so once contextual factors 
are introduced, these sizable genetic differ-
ences may very well be completely irrele-
vant to behavior. But they may also be rel-
evant, and to deny this possibility simply 
because we do not want it to be true alters 
the status of our inquiry from science to 
wishful thinking or perhaps even religion. 
The most startling revelation of all may be 
that social scientists have not conducted 
any tests to determine if these sizable ge-
netic variations from group to group have 
any behavioral implications.
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Conclusion
If understanding of politics is to ad-
vance, the grip of environmental determin-
ism must be loosened, and appreciation of 
the role of biology must extend beyond 
think pieces and “calls to arms.” Serious 
empirical research on the interaction of bi-
ological and environmental independent 
variables needs to become the order of the 
day. Recent work in cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience, experimental economics, 
and behavior genetics serves as a valuable 
guide for the manner in which empirical 
biopolitics should be conducted. This arti-
cle has given the most attention to behav-
ior genetics because momentum is build-
ing in this area and because its data and 
research methodologies are of a sort that is 
familiar to many political scientists.
The implications of a possible role for 
genetics in accounting for variance in po-
litical attitudes and behaviors across in-
dividuals and groups may seem disquiet-
ing, but acknowledging a role for genetics 
does not equate with intolerance. In fact, 
admitting that behavioral traits are par-
tially genetic may lead to a more tolerant 
world. Those who accept the growing evi-
dence that sexual orientation is influenced 
by both genetics and prenatal environment 
are generally more accepting of homosex-
uality than those who are convinced sex-
ual orientation is entirely determined by 
postnatal environmental forces (and there-
fore can be reprogrammed in boot camps). 
The same can be said for politics. Accept-
ing that those who differ from us politi-
cally are not being willfully bullheaded 
but may have a genetic predisposition to-
ward beliefs contrary to ours may take the 
edge off of the overheated political debate 
that characterizes conflicts between the left 
and the right. People understandably may 
not want to give up hope that their politi-
cal opponents can someday be turned from 
the dark side, but it still might be useful to 
recognize that certain individuals are ge-
netically predisposed toward certain polit-
ical orientations.
Summary Points
1. Twin studies offer a way to assess the 
extent to which genes are relevant to a 
trait.
2. Personal temperament is shaped by 
both genetic and environmental forces.
3. Political temperament is shaped by 
both genetic and environmental forces.
4. Political temperament may be a func-
tion of personal temperament but it 
also seems to have unique components.
5. Political scientists tend to know little 
about modern genetics and to ignore 
the genetic basis of political attitudes.
6. It is possible and desirable for political 
scientists to work with geneticists and 
to learn their techniques.
7. Incorporating genetics into the study 
of social behavior is the wave of the fu-
ture for the social sciences.
 
Future Directions
1. Twin studies with better data on politi-
cal variables.
2. Twin studies of social behavior such as 
decisions in economic games.
3. Adoption studies involving political 
variables and adult adoptees.
4. Association studies in which specific 
genetic alleles are checked for associa-
tion with particular political traits.
5. Comparing and contrasting personal 
and political temperaments.
6. Identifying the biological/neural sys-
tems relevant to political thinking.
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